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Shared secrecy in a digital age and a transnational world
Didier Bigo
ABSTRACT
This article examines the notion of shared secrets and the procedures by
which secrecy is not the opposite of exchange of information, but the
restriction of it to a certain ‘circle’ of people and the maintenance of
others in ignorance. It creates corridors depending on the objectives of
secret information, the persons having access, and the knowledge of this
access by other people. Shared secrecy has been considered as an
exception to common practice, but it has changed in scale with digitiza-
tion and transnationalization of information, especially when suspicion is
becoming used in statistical terms for prevention purposes.
Sharing secret information about suspects left in ignorance: mechanisms of
transnational logics of intelligence in a digital world
I begin this article by investigating the relations between secret information, national security and the
common understanding of secret intelligence as an exclusive product delivered by the intelligence
community regarding the politicians who decide what policy to follow regarding threats, risks and
vulnerabilities. I cross-examine the strong relation of exclusivity of secrecy between the national
intelligence agencies and their reluctance to share information with foreign countries. From the
Snowden disclosures of the National Security Agency (NSA) practices as the leader of an alliance
composed of diﬀerent SIGINT-internet intelligence services (the so-called Five Eyes), we have evidence
of the fact that information which has been intercepted in the digital space concerning localization of
individuals and things, identiﬁcation of these individuals by interconnections of diﬀerent data pertain-
ing to various bureaucracies and private companies, as well as information on social networks, is shared
between diﬀerent foreign countries and sometimes for very diﬀerent purposes. I propose the notion of
shared secret information, even if it looks like a paradox, to understand what is at stake today in a world
where the argument of a global insecurity pushes the diﬀerent services to transfer some information to
their ‘counterparts’ in allied countries, and the impact of this transnationalization of ‘national’ security
when the digital world destabilize the state boundaries. I analyze here the notion of shared secrecy in
the ﬁeld of exchange of information through the procedures by which a speciﬁc product of a logic of
doubt regarding marginal behaviours (as if they were a sign of guiltiness), produces a list of suspects,
which have no right to know why and how they became suspects. In that case, secrecy is not the strict
opposite of exchange of information, but the result of the collaboration of bureaucracies allowing the
restriction to a certain ‘circle’ of people with authority tomaintain the others in ignorance of the criteria
of this suspicion and their modalities of evaluation as well as the techniques they use. This creates a
problem regarding rule of Law and democratic principles, and supposes new discussions about the
boundaries between secrecy, security, publicity and scrutiny.
As we will see, shared secrecy is therefore not a new phenomenon opposed to exclusive
secrecy, but a long practice of communicating and exchanging information between diﬀerent
secret services organized into more or less informal alliances that simultaneously collaborate on
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certain topics while competing in others, or even on the same ones. This so-called coopetition was
regulated when intelligence was centrally about spying and counter-spying around military state
secrets. However, the scale of sharing secret information has been radically transformed when they
have addressed individuals at the world scale and when the digitization of the world has simulta-
neously allowed them to follow the traces left by mobile or chatting individuals in the digital realm.
In addition, nowadays the de-monopolization of intelligence practices correlated with the easiness
to put others under surveillance has challenged the boundaries of the professionals of secrets.
Private companies and individuals have used for their own purpose everyday forms of digital
surveillance. Shared secrecy has therefore reconﬁgured the ﬁeld of practices of secret services far
beyond their oﬃcial denominations and has included more and more traditional bureaucracies
working at the borders, on ﬁnance, on insurance, as well as many private companies, including
those who are not internet providers, but simply taken into the unbound securitization of everyday
life. If many scholars accept this increase of the scale of exchange of secret information between an
impressive range of actors, they still disagree on the reasons of such an increase. For some, this is
the result of the rise of insecurities beginning with transnational terrorist activities, organized crime
and inﬁltration of people on the move by these dangerous actors. Without denying that statistically
it may exist, most researchers consider that it is ultra-marginal, and that the dynamics of institu-
tions in their competitions and alliances are not reducible to a functionalist answer from external
threats. They insist on the existence of a ﬁeld of security professionals which exist as such, and not
only as the addition of national ﬁelds. This ﬁeld is organized around services who have the same
kind of techniques, methods and ethos. They are indigenously called ‘natural counterparts’. This is
in our view one key element to understand the development of these diﬀerent channels, ‘corridors’
of segmented information that nevertheless travel globally as secret information shared by many,
even if it is in an asymmetric way.
So, if secret intelligence is not any longer an exclusive property of a national community of
intelligence, who is now communicating with whom and on what type of secret intelligence informa-
tion? How and for what purposes? We are clearly beyond small numbers in circulation, we have a mass
production of ‘shared secrets’. The argument of national security has obscured this phenomenon for a
while. As long as this practice of exchanging secret information between diﬀerent services pertaining
to diﬀerent countries was restricted to a world of spying and counter-spying, i.e. a small world of
professionals that supposedly knew each other, it was possible to maintain the belief of a national
exclusivity. But the targets of these exchanges of intercepted communication regarding individuals or
behaviours of non-identiﬁed persons has become so intense, and so many observers have spoken of
mass surveillance to characterize this large-scale intrusive practice of building intelligence data on list
of suspects, that it cannot be sustained anymore.
In a second part, I detail the change of conﬁguration of the ﬁeld of the professionals of secretive
information which is correlated with the change of scale of shared information and the transforma-
tion of the boundaries of this ﬁeld under the eﬀects coming from its digitization, its privatization
and its transnationalization. I indicate that the current game of intelligence gathering is not led
only by the games of spying but by its penetration to the intimacy of so many individuals that are
objects of suspicion by correlations of proﬁles which are sometimes not associated with a reason-
able cause and generate arbitrariness.1 But, in my view, if the extension of the ﬁeld of shared
secrecy and intelligence is so advanced, it is not at the same moment a homogeneous phenom-
enon leading towards a trend of a global society of surveillance. The analysis of intelligence service
actors, their social use of technologies, their own beliefs, show that old and new actors, heirs and
pretenders, compete between themselves, and disagree on the limits, the boundaries of legitimate
actions of an economy of doubt expanding to millions of people put under suspicion beyond fact
ﬁnding, on the basis of correlations structured by algorithms based themselves on the ﬂow of data
considered as shared secret information. In democratic societies, it implies a public debate about
these limits. Publicity, scrutiny and secrecy have to be held simultaneously, and strategies of
communication are now crucial for secret services. They have to explain their policies, not in detail,
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but on the principles by which they conduct them. Karen Lund Petersen suggests a change in the
mode of communication by intelligence services with their audiences. They may be considered as
earmarked only for the government and completed only for those who are elaborating national
security decisions. In this vision sharing information is limited and needs to be constructed on an
ad hoc base. The idea of public scrutiny is considered as antithetic with the role of secret services,
and numerous publications of intelligence services insist on the fact that their purpose is to exist
outside of the realm of the rule of Law, to do what is expressly forbidden by law but necessary for
the country. Public scrutiny has therefore no place, control has to be done internally and by those
who have given orders in case of malpractices. Nevertheless, at least two new paradigms emerge
where the public plays a role. In the post-war on terror, it has been considered necessary to
increase both the number of players and scrutiny. Information sharing within the sphere of the
diﬀerent agencies collecting information for the common struggle against terrorism, especially
jihadism, has decompartmentalised the search for national interest and promoted more automated
forms of data sharing with a large number of partners beyond traditional alliances, and encouraged
a policy explaining to the public what secret services are doing for their protection and why they
are cooperating between them. Beyond this more ‘pedagogical’ approach, a third model even
suggests that the citizen collaborate and co-produce information in an encompassing view of
protection against catastrophic events and organisation of resilience. This co-production may lead
in that case to more scrutiny and oversight2
Secrecy today: reformulating the question
Against a certain common sense, secrets are not a way to mask information to everyone and a form
of solipsism, they are always shared and almost always partially disclosed to create an attraction
around their importance. A secret forgotten by everyone is not any more a secret. Procedures to
restrict access are central as they mask part of the content but advertise the existence of a secret.
Procedures therefore organise asymmetrical relations and provide for a group a certain amount of
symbolic power by distributing the information along a continuum going from who is completely
ignorant to who is less ignorant, instead of creating an impassable border between ignorance and
knowledge. Everybody knows a bit of secrecy but not everything.
This creates an internal hierarchy and diﬀerentiates the insiders and the outsiders on the basis of the
subtraction of a document or just a couple of relevant lines to the list of available documents. The social
relation of secrecy is therefore functioning as a hierarchy inside those who share the knowledge that a
secret exists, and this hierarchy is certainly more important for the everyday of the actors than the
barrier opposing all of them to the people who ignore completely the existence of a relevant secret.
Secrecy is therefore like a pole in a magnetic ﬁeld attracting people of diﬀerent origins, and
diﬀerent services. It creates a form of ‘complicity’ between them and is a marker of objective
relations into a ﬁeld of practices. In the words of David Omand: ‘If all knowledge is power, secret
knowledge is turbo-charged power. It is in the nature of secret intelligence that it can be used to
ensure access to policy-makers and build inﬂuence and prestige for the collecting agency. The risks
in terms of over-promising to buy favour and then under-delivering, as seems to have been the
case with Iraq WMD intelligence, become all the greater if secrecy is being used to reinforce
personal relationships and ensure face-time with the leader’.3 In his narrative the national commit-
tee (here the Joint Intelligence Committee) is a crucial mediator for the exchange, but while that
may exist in the UK, our research shows that in other countries the mediation is almost ineﬃcient
or even non-existent despite the discourse of collaboration or the existence of formal fusion
centres that replicate old data analysis instead of contributing to the production of timely
intelligence. In other countries like the US, France, Germany, Spain, Italy, it seems that the diﬀerent
agencies exchange more with their foreign counterparts than with the national agencies doing
data interception by other means, and who have limited trust in the other methods. The level of
competition between national intelligence services seems higher and the collaboration weaker.
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In addition, this type of sharing of secret information works only if the participants of all the
continuum are eager to know, if they believe in the value of secrecy. If they do not, if they consider
the secret superﬂuous, the information not valuable for their own purposes, the power based on
the diﬀerential of (lack of) knowledge disappears.
So, if secrecy, as we proposed is not a technical element, but a politics, then secrecy is used and
considered as a form of symbolic power having strong eﬀects on the positions of the actors, vis a
vis each other. The resource is not concentrated on a speciﬁc case or document giving access to
certain knowledge, it is the authority emerging from the right to know which is important, and
which is sometimes diﬀerent from the bureaucratic structure itself. To say that diﬀerently, it is not
because the absence of knowledge reveals an unknown which, once known, will give an additional
reality, a key to understand the world, that secrecy is powerful. The discovery of a secret is rarely
changing a situation in itself. What count in fact, are the transformations by which the procedures
of secrecy are operating or not by selecting who is entitled to claim that he knows ‘things’ that the
others don’t know, and that he cannot reveal these elements for their own good, as it may
endanger them. Trust in him, in his role of protector by those who know less is therefore necessary
(and even more inside the services).
Secrecy is therefore not the object of the diﬀerent intelligence services but the architecture, the
exoskeleton which built internal hierarchies as a result of the performative claims and rituals around
the right of access and the proclamation that a speciﬁc element has to be classiﬁed. This is what
constructs the chains of dependence between the actors of the ﬁeld and these hierarchies are also
what destroy the so-called sense of a ‘community of intelligence’ where equality inter pares (experts)
would be the rule. Part of the life of secret services is organised along this discrimination which also
directs the sense of allegiance, which may diﬀer from the oﬃcial ﬂow-chart.
Shared secrets in transnational alliance: yes to exchange of information but not
everything is for your eyes
It would be an illusion to think that national security acquired by national means only has been the
rule until recently. National security has almost always been acquired through transnational types
of collaboration. But a nationalist take on this topic which overvalues the coherence of the
government and the national state as ‘one’ actor has led to this illusion (in the Bourdieusian
sense) of a national sovereignty on the data regime of intelligence, which in fact does not exist in
practice, but is repeated again and again as a form of justiﬁcation of the intrusive practices,
especially regarding the fact that they are and were addressed centrally towards foreigners. This
justiﬁcation by the national means only of capture of data exists as a categorical imperative for a
narrative valorising the legitimation of national security over the rule of law as it existentializes
some events and masks others. In practice, sharing information between diﬀerent national services
of diﬀerent countries has been a very common practice. Diﬀerent governments had to exchange
diﬀerent bits of information to make sense of the overall picture. The ﬁrst books on the raison
d’Etat in the 16th century explain immediately the advantages of sharing information, but the IR
narrative of the mid 1960s has invisibilized these sources and insisted that ‘intelligence services’
don’t share information abroad, that they capitalise them and enter into collaboration only at the
national level and rarely, selectively, with foreign allies. But it is obvious that the two phenomena
are not opposed. Secrecy works very well with exchange, and not only with a monopoly of one
person or group. National exclusivity on the means and construction of intelligence data is a doxa
from the World War II and the cold war, but has never been a practice. Sharing began as soon as
technologies of communication and surveillance at distance existed. Galileo’s spyglass, for exam-
ple, provided one of the ﬁrst ways to anticipate ﬁghts to come, and the advent of the telegraph
changed the scale of combat, integrating transnational activities for local ﬁghts.4 The US army
during the World War I was certainly among the ﬁrst to develop a strategy of intelligence sharing
with certain protocols organising levels of diﬀerential access.5 It became even more important
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during the Second World War and from that time, transnational alliances have existed with high
level of exchanges while keeping levels of secrets into a small group of ‘specialists’ of management
of sensitive information.6 Nevertheless, the process of extension of meaning of intelligence
information, the globalisation of the risk narrative and digitization, have extended the phenom-
enon beyond the capacity of controls, and with internet developments it was almost impossible
not to have disclosures of the practices of interception.
As Warner develops; ‘ﬁnally intelligence took on a multiplicity of meanings, some of them only
barely overlapping. It remained a synonym for espionage, of course, but it also came to mean any
sort of information that decision makers might need to select a course of action. It also came to
mean the overall system that manages the state’s espionage (and counterespionage) function, its
collection of secrets and non-secrets for ministers and commanders, its interaction with friendly
intelligence services, and the work product of these functions. In short, those secret activities had
become systematized as intelligence’.7
This implies a reversal of causality. Intelligence has been the end results of many diﬀerent
practices, heterogeneous and on the move in terms of purposes and technologies. It has not been
an organisational principle regulating nationally state survival and interests. The government of
one country has never been in practice in a monopolistic position. The state is a ﬁeld of action, not
an actor. And some transnational ﬁelds have intersected strongly with the national state ﬁeld, even
gaining supremacy where sending secret information to a foreign agency was considered as a
more important loyalty to respect than the one with the national politicians. The BND aﬀair in
Germany and its link with the NSA are one among many examples of these practices. This does not
mean that in other cases the national imperative is not working against foreign collaboration if
sensitive matters (industrial secrets for example) are at stake. In the Five Eyes messages, the NSA
has ﬂagged messages with the label NOFORN to restrict access to the knowledge of another
country selectively. Typically, the CIA has posted advice for US government operatives inﬁltrating
Shengen explaining how to avoid controls to conduct action on allied territories without their
knowledge. It was under NOFORN (WikiLeaks release 21 December 2014). But, beyond the anec-
dotes of commercial inﬂuences and the fact that some countries are not under a no-spy agree-
ment, even those with such an agreement have been subjected to spying through collaboration
between the agencies working on the same domain but simultaneously with the ignorance of the
other national agencies, and even of the government. Allegations have been made that if the
suspicion of terrorism regarding a foreigner may compromise US interests, they may not inform the
targeted country, even if it is an ally. In addition to these complex situations, where important
information is not delivered, we may add also cases where the allied agencies are aware but do not
communicate with their own political authorities. Paradoxically, it could be said these cases are
rare, but are often among the most important to know for the national security of the country at
the governmental level. When they are kept inside a speciﬁc channel, the game is therefore more
highly complex than the image on national-foreign exchange may suggest. It pluralises the
‘corridors’ of information, depending on the bilateral relations between the agencies, indepen-
dently of national government’s disagreement.8
The consequences of this de-monopolisation are sometimes not fully considered. The national
state game is only one of the many games for intelligence data. Despite the break through, Michael
Warner for example continues to believe in the supremacy of states and in a Westphalian world
where Max Weber’s deﬁnition of the state continues to be pre-eminent, where private is obeying
public through delegation, where internet companies are subordinate to government, where
digital is just an expression of the ‘real’ (oﬀ line). We suggest the need to de-essentialize the
state even more. It is important to take into consideration the changes to the ﬁelds of power at the
transnational level and how they aﬀect politics. Reasoning in terms of national security is no longer
a coherent way to understand how shared secrecy is connected and circulates, how public and
private actors are now so intertwined that we have to speak of hybrid security and not of a public-
private partnership, and in addition to explain the multiplication of the eﬀective practices of secret
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services which pass through the publication of nominal lists of suspects (individual and organisa-
tions) and call for the collaboration of the public in the identiﬁcation and localisation of these
suspects. This shift is what I have called the emergence of a digital reason of state on a transna-
tional scale
Towards the emergence of a ﬁeld of digital reason of state populated by
transnational guilds of extraction of secret information
If it is crucial to do a sociogenesis of the secret intelligence ﬁeld to avoid the illusion that it is
completely new, it is also important to observe the transformations connected with the eruption of
the digital age and the ease of surveillance which facilitate both the sharing of information and the
explosion of secrets and uncovering of them via internet technologies and the role of private
companies. I insist here that the scale and scope of surveillance and the transnationalization of
intelligence services we have witnessed over the last few years require a renewed investigation of
contemporary world security practices on the one hand, but also a careful mapping of our very
own categories of analysis on the other.
Sovereignty, secrecy, security communities, territory, border control, technology, intelligence
and rule of law have inevitably ended up meaning diﬀerent things for diﬀerent people. What is
under question is not one of these categories over another, but how all these categories have
simultaneously changed. I am arguing here that this boils down to an argument over the digitisa-
tion and heterogenization of Raison d’Etat (Reason of State) destabilising public and private,
internal and foreign, shared and (national) secret distinctions.
Key to my argument about the transnational ﬁelds of shared secret information channels (or
corridors), is to understand and analyse how the classic Raison d’Etat and its contemporary
iterations, such as national security, have undergone profound mutation with the process of
digitisation, the emerging ‘dataﬁcation’ of our societies and the extension of police and intelligence
services. I do not develop here the long genealogy of these relations and causations, but I consider
that the ﬁeld of shared secret information is dependent in its extension and reconﬁguration
towards less HUMINT and more SIGINT activities on ‘the emergence of a digital reason of state’
based on the possibility for intelligence services of diﬀerent countries extending their goals of
prevention and prediction of crime to a global reach, convincing their own politicians that the
future of intelligence is clear: it is to include and expand technologies collecting traces of human
activities.9 This increase in and need to gather digital communication and data, once accepted
politically, has nurtured in return a wider transnational collaboration amongst national intelligence
and security professionals and resulted in an extension of the category of foreign intelligence to
share data that could be of national concern more speciﬁcally. This has created a spiral eﬀect. By
projecting national security ‘inside out’, via a transnational alliance of the professionals of national
security and sensitive data, an ‘outside in’ eﬀect of suspicion for all Internet subjects has been
created, destabilising the protection for national citizens if they are communicating with foreigners.
It changes the categories of ‘foreign’ and ‘domestic’ by dispersing them and transforming the line
that separated them into a Möbius strip.10
The division between internal and external practices of intelligence and secrecy, while main-
tained to ease the possibility without warrant on foreign intelligence is de facto obsolete. It does
not mean that we are encountering a merging of internal and external into a global without
boundaries, but we observe a logic where, intersubjectively, everything is analysed either as
external or internal depending on the interests of the surveillant-actors, even if, more recently,
the Courts have tried to reverse the reasoning of the services and to show that they cannot choose
the legislation of foreign or domestic the way they want, but have to regulate the interception with
more general principles: necessity, proportionality.11
This is what we will examine now. What have been the consequences for the targets of
intelligence of the change of regime of intelligence data privileging transnational exchanges and
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digitization? Certainly, digitization at the world scale has been contemporary to the phenomenon
of hybridization of the public and private logic. This has created many questions about the level of
participation of many private entities into the circulation of information on one side and of their
participation in channels of secret intelligence, either indirectly, as provider of information they
retain but do not analyse themselves, or more directly when they are asked to contribute to
develop them.
These two phenomena of hybridization and digitization have transformed the relation between
intelligence, surveillance and obedience (or compliance) in everyday democracy. This has been done in
western countries without much protest, and even after the disclosures of practices in such a detailed
manner andwith the participation ofmajor newspapers, the general public has considered that it was a
question for professionals, not for them, to decide on the boundaries between secret procedures and
democratic rulings.12 Some commentators have therefore considered that ‘the people’ have accepted
the fate of an evolution that they like (or not) but cannot change.13
This is the belief of a technological determinism within surveillance that I want nevertheless to
challenge because in the end this is the main argument in favour of the prolongation of secrecy
procedures without proper oversight and scrutiny by public mechanisms. People do not accept
surveillance, they are just unaware of the high level of circulation of shared secrets and if they
knew, they would be less keen to participate to it. But, before discussing the consequences of this
circulation of shared secrets, we need to emphasize how they are exchanged today in such
increasing numbers.
Channelling secret information? How and for what purposes?
As explained by Sir David Omand: ‘For intelligence and law enforcement to be able to identify
communications of interest and, where authorized, to access the content of relevant communica-
tions themselves is in fact a harder technical challenge than the many internal NSA PowerPoint
presentations stolen by Snowden might suggest’.14 And this is certainly true. PowerPoints are
oriented towards presentations and so simplify techniques, they are not ‘truth’ about practices.
Nevertheless, they give indications about the ways the services enter into contact, what software
helps them to automatize some type of exchanges, and the correlations between the technical
systems and the judicial obligations.
Obviously secret services share much data between them, but in very asymmetrical ways and
through very diﬀerent levels of right of access.15 Exchange has never meant equality of situation.
Here exchange is the result of the structural positions of the diﬀerent services regarding each other
and not just a relation of ‘trust’ between them. Sharing information is highly diﬀerentiated: what is
on oﬀer for a ‘foreign’ partner may be the data on some individuals if the foreign partner asks and
already knows who they are, or key elements of the identiﬁcation. It may be access to far more
general and numerous data that can facilitate a search for identiﬁcation criteria (for example a bank
account transaction, or vaguer criteria where the period is a full month with the criteria only that
money is coming from an unknown bank account but whose country deposit is known – Mali to
Norway transiting via…). It may also be a series of tools interconnecting databases via interoper-
ability platforms or search tools but limited access to data. And it may be general results of data
analytics but without any names. All these modalities are diﬀerent. Some like the ﬁrst and the last
are old practices. The second and third are more recent, connected with digital capacities to deliver
large scale of data for imprecise criteria quickly. The human capacities to treat the data once
ﬁltered are therefore of crucial importance. Technical skills are insuﬃcient if they are automatized,
they need to be held by specialists.
Only the powerful services get a chance to use to their proﬁt the sharing of data. Their number
of personnel, budgets and position regarding the internet traﬃc are key elements that we have
analysed elsewhere.16 In addition, to add a layer of complexity, they are not, by far, the only actors
involved. The access in bulk to substantial quantities of the Internet supposes the interception and
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storage of metadata and sometimes the data related to these metadata. To access internet cables
they often work with their own private companies who have built or collaborate in the construc-
tion of cables and the latter are key actors in the interception practices of data and the secrecy
about this interception.
Once the services have the saved metadata which can provide information concerning when
and to whom phone calls are made or emails and texts are sent, they still have to identify the
suspects, and they are often obliged, beyond their own national resources, to look at international
databases through diﬀerent requests, either directly in a bilateral manner if they know in what
country they may be, or via what is called ‘Advanced “front end” tools allowing analysts to
eﬃciently access and run advanced queries on intercepted data, in particular, in order to discover
new leads in their investigations’.17
Among diﬀerent tools, one can quote ICREACH for exchange between US agencies and their
closed counterparts, and one which has been highly popularized, Xkeyscore. Xkeyscore is a
program that has been shared with other intelligence agencies including the Australian Signals
Directorate (ASD), Canada’s Communications Security Establishment, New Zealand’s Government
Communications Security Bureau, Britain’s Government Communications Headquarters, but also
Japan’s Defense Intelligence Headquarters and the German Bundesnachrichtendienst. Xkeyscore
allows searching and analysis of global Internet data, with speciﬁc selectors and a high speed
answer. According to an NSA slide presentation about XKeyscore from 2013, it is a ‘Digital Network
Intelligence Exploitation System/Analytic Framework’. According to a good Wikipedia article,
‘XKeyscore holds raw and unselected communications traﬃc, so analysts can perform queries
using “strong selectors” like e-mail addresses, but also using “soft selectors”, like keywords, against
the body texts of e-mail and chat messages and digital documents and spreadsheets in English,
Arabic and Chinese.’18
A second program, less well known, is ICREACH.19 In a nutshell, the National Security Agency is
secretly providing data to nearly two dozen U.S. government agencies with a ‘Google-like’ search
engine built to share more than 850 billion records about phone calls, emails, cellphone locations
and internet chats. ICREACH contains information on the private communications of foreigners
and, it appears, millions of records on American citizens who have not been accused of any
wrongdoing but have entered into some previous proﬁles of suspicion and have been kept there,
just in case. As Ryan Gallagher explains ‘ICREACH has been accessible to more than 1,000 analysts
at 23 U.S. government agencies that perform intelligence work, according to a 2010 memo. A
planning document from 2007 lists the DEA, FBI, Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense
Intelligence Agency as core members. Information shared through ICREACH can be used to track
people’s movements, map out their networks of associates, help predict future actions, and
potentially reveal religious aﬃliations or political beliefs.’20 The search tool was designed to be
the largest system for internally sharing secret surveillance records in the United States, capable
of handling two to ﬁve billion new records every day, including more than 30 diﬀerent kinds of
metadata on emails, phone calls, faxes, internet chats, and text messages, as well as location
information collected from cellphones. ICREACH does not appear to have a direct relationship to
the large NSA database, previously reported by The Guardian that stores information on millions
of ordinary Americans’ phone calls under Section 215 of the Patriot Act. Unlike the Section 215
database, which is accessible to a small number of NSA employees and can be searched only in
terrorism-related investigations, ICREACH grants access to a vast pool of data that can be mined
by analysts from across the intelligence community for ‘foreign intelligence’. Data available
through ICREACH appears to be primarily derived from surveillance of foreigners’ communica-
tions, and planning documents show that it draws on a variety of diﬀerent sources of data
maintained by the NSA.21
It seems that on speciﬁc occurrences, ICREACH was also opened to other partners of the Five
Eyes plus, including Canada and Australia, but this has been denied. We cannot know if it was a
two-way circulation between agencies or if it was only one-way, with Australian and Canadian data
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being stored into ICREACH. In that case the ASD may have fed information into the NSA’s vast
ICREACH search engine but not had access to it.22
We have certainly to learn more on the right of access and to avoid the sensationalism of some
media, but we are clearly beyond small numbers. Shared secrecy is about the millions of pieces of
individual information and metadata circulating between transnational data bases. They are the
virtual ‘haystack’ mobilized when proﬁles of suspicion are constructed for a speciﬁc purpose. But,
and it is one of the speciﬁcs of the data analytics program, they are oriented towards prevention
and conceived to build predictive proﬁling around a speciﬁc hypothesis of doubt concerning
‘abnormal behaviours’ and-or trajectories and-or multiple identities. This future perfect orientation
of a future already known is in itself a problem as machine learning works to conﬁrm hypotheses,
not to invalidate their basic assumptions, and the correlations uncovered by the analytics cannot
be considered as proof of causality, a lesson Emile Durkheim set out in his famous book on suicide
with reference to the correlation of suicide and sunspots.23
The arguments of prevention and prediction: an ideology or a reasonable
justiﬁcation for exceptional means?
A story is constructed based on the potentiality of the system. It is said that it is now possible to
trace almost all of the online activities that an Internet user undertakes during the day: what they
read on the web or purchase on Amazon, what they send to colleagues and family members via
email, what sort of holidays they take and whether they travel abroad, and what kind of online
payment system they use. The capacity to act at distance has increased the traceability of data; the
possibility of data retention; the capacity to build software that enables complex relations between
databases, and to deduct from these data emerging trends, statistical categories of behaviours or
individuals; and the belief that these emergent and minority trends give intelligence services an
advantage in conducting their various activities such as espionage, economic intelligence, and the
struggle against terrorism and crime.
The overall argument of a permanent war on terror and its claimed necessity to connect always
more of the lacking dots to the large network of people under electronic surveillance, succeeds, it
seems, to move the people living in liberal states to consider that they need Total Information
Awareness against erratic violence led by revenge and widespread diﬀusion. Authorities need to
have a grip to anticipate the future, to suspect rightly the people who act abnormally, because
they are preparing the worst. The argument of a pre-crime society has replaced that of a society
liberated from communist collectivism.
This is the new utopia of a society conducted by anticipative knowledge built through data
analytics where proﬁling is more and more subtle and self-correcting, while data collected are
bigger and bigger and, once retained, ﬁltered, and selected on speciﬁc requests. They allow for
better detection of the white noises, the black swans, the abnormal behaviours, everything that
does not ﬁt with the ‘normal’ order. A diﬀerent political imagination has radicalized the fear of
global terrorism and the necessity of a maximum and global security regime to counter terrorism
on the one side, and on the other has also produced a fear of an Orwellian world in the making, in
which citizens are systematically spied upon in their everyday practices.24 But most secret intelli-
gence professionals ﬁght against this ideological stance and resist the argument of a scientiﬁc
prediction. They accept the idea of forecasting on precise consequences, but do not see them-
selves as astrologers. Nevertheless, some are tempted to play that role to please politicians in
charge and the industry building these systems.
This ‘knowledge’ of predictive analytics is said to be the answer to the dissemination of violence
into inter-individual relations, a technological ﬁx that reconstructs the political in liberal democ-
racies far from the eruption of political violence. Politics will no longer be a question of ideological
judgments, but a question of anticipation of the hidden enemy, of its stealth moves. Politics will be
the art of war supplied by the technology of traceability and the use of a Maxwell’s Demon
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activated in some computers to know the positions and trajectories of all human beings suspected
of distorting the norms and of being at the margins. Joining the dream of expertise with astrology,
connecting hard science and religious sacriﬁcial rituals, destroying the political as a relation to
focus on the margins, mixing the image of the future with an old past of superstition, this
reasoning is in addition the one that favours protection of society over the rights of the individual
and destroys the very idea of privacy and freedom of thought. But, to the despair of many activists,
people on the web do not react in mass against these practices.
De-monopolization of the ﬁeld of secrecy: spying and counter spying, secret
defence, national security, industrial secrets, everyday surveillance
If answers about the activities and group of people in charge of the extraction of secret, sensitive
and personal information was easy during the period of the Second World War and then the Cold
War, with its rituals around spying and counter spying, monopolised by the most powerful states to
monitor the activities of the other system of alliance in terms of armaments and technological
progress, this is not the case anymore. We have developed in detail the conditions under which the
specialised group or more exactly the guilds of secret, sensitive and personal information have
evolved with the digitization of the reason of state.25 Consider the example of the speciﬁc politics
of hostility against lawyers by the Bush administration to create the idea that technological
progress needs to be used at its full scale and without restriction because of the context of secret
war. In that context without even the need to know, any opportunity to know cannot be neglected
to anticipate the future. Every data that can help to build proﬁles of suspects is therefore
considered as a legitimate source by the intelligence services. This vision is one that is at war
with the rule of Law and public-judicial scrutiny but the neo-conservatives nevertheless succeeded
in modifying the economy of the ﬁeld of secret intelligence by justifying large-scale collection of
data captured almost directly from internet cables and without proper warrants.26 Polls have not
shown strong resistance. As a result, it has allowed a course to harvest data, a form of digital
encomienda authorizing the people involved into the interception of data, and the enrolment (by
coercion or strong suggestion) of the biggest US companies in the ﬁeld of Internet data and social
networks to consider individual data as their ‘property’.27 More structurally, if this has been possible
to pursue beyond the oﬃcial end of the war on terror, it is also because intercepting data which
are conﬁdential can be done very cheaply and with considerably less eﬀort than before, the ratio of
surveillant-surveillees moving from 4/1 to 1/hundreds.28 Even more generally, as very well
explained by Warner in The Rise and Fall of Intelligence: ‘Today, many states (beyond the cold
war alliances) can do so once again; and what is more, private entities and even individuals (some
with criminal motivations) can gather secrets and manipulate events around the globe. The skills
needed to “do” intelligence have diﬀused around the world and across societies; they can literally
be purchased online. The problems caused by this spread of intelligence, moreover, now reach
beyond the security services to corporate oﬃces and private homes. In short, intelligence has
traded uniqueness for ubiquity’.29
Secrecy of little secrets coming from intimate life has invaded the world of intelligence while
secrets, even of some importance, are shared by more and more people who have not been
trained by their education and profession to respect the rituals around them. To sum up, for
decades, the ﬁeld was delimitated along crystallized lines. The actors were public bodies called
secret services and they were arguing that secrecy was a necessity for protecting the national
security of each state, but now with the digitization of information and the globalization of the
exchange of information as well as the riskiﬁcation of the world where distant catastrophes may
have an impact in every local place, the boundaries are no longer ‘waterproof’ between the ‘secret’
services and other public or private bodies.
The legitimacy of the ‘public secret services’ claiming to be the sole experts in providing analysis
for national security is now destabilized. Private organizations collecting data, managing them with
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more eﬃcient tools, challenge their monopoly and invade their territory of secrecy obliging them
to have collusive transactions enlarging the sphere of shared secrets.30 International exchange of
information and the belief that ‘big’ data analytics are based more on big numbers than on small
and smart data, are also challenging the national character of the collection-interception of data
and privilege large groupings of services who have the same know-how but diﬀerent nationalities
and interests. The fact that specialists are sceptical about these capacities of artiﬁcial ‘unintelli-
gence’ has not yet changed popular and journalistic beliefs.
The notion of shared secrets in a transnational world: the ﬁve eyes plus practices
revealed
The disclosures in 2013 by Edward Snowden of the secret US-NSA programme, PRISM, and of more
than a thousand types of intrusive software with genuinely hush-hush codenames have raised
serious concerns about the scope and scale, the qualitative and quantitative dimensions, of
surveillance of everyday internet users for intelligence purposes. What has been done by the
NSA and the Five Eyes network during the previous 10 years, in secret? Is it possible in democracies
to act in such a way, which is certainly less directly violent than the CIA’s physical networks, but
nevertheless problematic for democratic forms of states?
Quite clearly, Snowden’s disclosures of NSA practices have sparked signiﬁcant public and
political concerns. Some concerns about security to start with – security for whom? – were identical
to the critique of the war on terror, but they were followed by questions about technological
progress and a sense of the ineluctability of the deprivation of conﬁdentiality and privacy in our
modes of communication, wrapped around an overall argument about the inherently violent,
unsecured and dangerous state of the world.
The extension via the digitization of information of the number of people inside a procedure of
restriction of access, as well as the generalization of large transatlantic channels of exchange of
information exacerbates the tensions between the actors participating to the production of
secrecy. And this is what we will analyze now. Are the secret services losing the control of secrecy
for (national) security? Are they obliged to compose with other actors who manage more secret
procedures of secrecy than themselves inside the general management of information? Who has
the authority to control sensitive information and to frame it under secrecy? It seems that the
destabilization of the initial conditions of secret services regarding spying and counter spying
where the rules for national security secrets (including exchanging individuals) were set up is so
strong that the barriers distinguishing who the secret services are have exploded, with the de-
monopolisation of the practices of spying and counter spying, with the privatization of surveillance,
with the commercialization of the Internet and its willingness to make money from personal data,
with the desire to anticipate the future of human beings. The de-assembling and re-assembling of
the secret services beyond the public services of a state including private contributors, and beyond
the national territory with the integration of heterogeneous information beyond internal collection
of data, is interrogating the very nature of the group of persons who are the professionals of
extraction of (secret, sensitive and personal) information.
There certainly lies a change in the regime of justiﬁcation of national security within this
argument. First a justiﬁcation has been expressed and presented openly, because the scandal
open by the disclosure of large-scale surveillance was too strong to enable a return to opacity, to
the traditional: ‘no comment, no denial’ policy. But, the national security argument has been
connected centrally with the large-scale intrusive data interceptions the press has called mass
surveillance and bulk collection, while the services and the internet providers have considered that
their methods were necessary, appropriate and proportionate.
The controversy has implied on the technological side a branching out of existing rhizomatic
commercial surveillance for proﬁt and intrusive methods of interception and collection of personal
information by specialized intelligence services and their contractors. It has also opened a legal
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conﬂict with the judiciary on many fronts, and the national security terminology, which was in
many countries a doctrine coming from the US and the UK, has nevertheless entered legislation
after the Snowden disclosures of 2013, even if for most of them – France, Germany, Spain, Italy –
the notion of ‘secret defense’ is still more relevant in a legal context than that of national security.
A counter move: rule of law, human rights countering technological arguments and
necessity of intrusive intelligence?
National Courts and European Courts have been more and more clear in their judgements post-2010
that if it is to the government to decide the content of national security, this cannot be completely
discretionary. This has been and is still the main challenge theoretically for the term national security
and the encapsulated practices of human and technological intelligence. National security (and the
secrecy around it) cannot be transformed into a blanket for executive arbitrariness that other powers
and citizens cannot check. Even when citizens believe that, in general, agents of secret services are also
good citizens, they want nevertheless to have the capacity to diﬀerentiate inside the group, to punish
those who have acted against inviolable rights, like the prohibition against torture, and to know who
has given these orders. From the 2010s, in a not yet stabilised doctrine, a framing, which has been
developed in Europe via the role of Courts (ECJ and ECHR), but also in national courts in the UK or
Germany, has contradicted the US NSA approach of the post-war on terror era based on amoremilitary
and strategic vision justifying the president’s power and its own practices. It seems that in Europe,
legally, national security cannot trump the Rule of Law and democracy for political opportunist interest,
the derogations have to be necessary and proportional to the threat. The threat itself cannot be the
product of a ﬂourishing imagination, it needs some evidence of an actual project of realisation.
Prevention is not ﬁction, anticipation has to have grounds.
Nevertheless, the reactions of the highest courts, acclaimed by activists and lawyers challenging
the government have not transformed the everyday practices of internet users, and push them to
defend by themselves their rights of data protection, privacy and forms of freedom which are
endangered by intrusive intelligence. The argument of the necessity of struggle against terrorism
has been quite powerful, as well as the argument that the traces left by the use of internet and the
limitations of privacy are the normal counterpart of more communication at distance, as
Zuckerberg bluntly said. Nevertheless, after the Cambridge Analytica scandal involving researchers,
strategic communication ﬁrms and google research for proﬁt via the brokerage of personal data for
other commercial (or political) means, and the development in Europe of General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR), the argument of the necessity of collecting data to have access to digital tools
simplifying everyday life begins to be challenged, as well as the politics of the SIGINT-Internet
secret services, and the logics of the capitalism of platforms which are intertwinned with the
escalation of the numbers of little secrets in circulation.
Conclusion: Is it possible to be innocent in a world of suspects? Conformity
regarding the diagonal of intelligence, surveillance and compliance
The consequences of this taming of the future are aﬀecting democratic dimensions. Do we have
‘scientiﬁc’ oracles to listen or is this noise about the new form of reasoning a way for an industry of
surveillance to sell products and to convince us that anyone in the public is innocent, but he is the
only one, all the others being for good reason, suspects? Is it in that case a way to advance
compliance of consumers towards a more invisible surveillance? The conjunction of capacities to
collect data easily and massively at a cheap price, reversing the relation between intelligence work
and surveillance by collection of large-scale data, and facilitating the accumulation over the quality
of information contained into these data, has reinforced this dream of anticipation of the future
and the discourse of a pre-emptive or preventive action. It has dressed this myth with some clothes
of informatics sciences that do not ﬁt together. It has destroyed guilt and innocence for a policy of
390 D. BIGO
permanent suspicion. More importantly even, it has transformed the image of potential suspect
into the one of an enemy criminal, of an intimate public enemy, and has rendered banal this ﬁgure
of the suspect with no right, no chance to defend himself, no chance to change his mind. As soon
as the suspect emerges from a list of names, he is not anymore a potential suspect, a potential
terrorist, he becomes a terrorist, a murderer. Digitization operates magically with a politics of
number that concretise, operationalise the ﬁgure of the invisible, of the unknown. This is why
analysing the conditions of the emergence of digitization and the link with the transformation of
intelligence is so important. It is not just a correlation, a chance for the Sigint Service that their ﬁeld
has exploded in size and importance, it goes further. The Internet is not just an accumulator of
data, it is a translator of logic. We are now all virtually living as the only innocent in a world of
suspects.
To sum up, to understand the eﬀects of the connection between intelligence practices and the
rise of technologies connected to the digitization of the world is complex. So too is the possibility
of tracing actions with the ambition of knowing and anticipating the future. Methodologically, it is
diﬃcult to distinguish between the pretenses to know, and the eﬀective capacities to discover
trends oriented towards future human actions. This depends on the belief about preventive actions
and scientiﬁc prediction coming as an outcome of large-scale collection of information (in bulk).
But, I contend here against other analysts, who argue that this transformation is the inevitable
product of an evolution of technologies related to the internet and the more general digitization of
the world and its impact on the ‘oﬀ-line’ world. The path transforming the Internet into a tool of
surveillance and the social networks into forms of co-watching reinforcing in-group rules as well as
reframing subjectivities by reinforcing compliance, is not an historical necessity, and is not with us
forever. It is the product of discretionary acts of politics at a certain moment.
The so-called inevitability of escape from a society of surveillance today is therefore not a
description of the world as it is, but a form of doxa inherited from the extension of the ﬁeld of
extraction of information to a new set of actors, which is the product of certain dynamics of
struggle between the actors managing digital information and especially data based on individual
traces, be they from private actors and commercial logics or from governments and their services
of interception of communication and security logics. Surveillance is therefore not inherent from
communication and information gathering. It depends on a speciﬁc conﬁguration of actors that
succeed in diﬀerentiating themselves from other actors as the legitimate owners of secrecy, and
the ones distinguishing suspects from innocents.
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